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Abstract
Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may
harm those who are not so favoured. Other papers have produced ev-
idence consistent with the presence of such favouritism but have been
unable to consider methods for controlling it. We address this issue
in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer, where one
particular league introduced professional referees in 2001-02, thereby
changing the financial incentives faced by these referees. Because the
change was not effected in all leagues, the ‘experiment’ has both cross-
sectional and intertemporal dimensions. We study the effects of pro-
fessional referees on a common measure of referee bias: length of in-
jury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised a degree of
favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having con-
trolled for selection and soccer-wide effects. We also discuss the suit-
ability of the variable that we, and others, use to measure favouritism,
noting that alternative interpretations may be possible.
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1 Introduction
A central tenet of principal-agent theory is that a combination of financial
rewards and (imperfect) monitoring can be used by principals to incentivise
their agents. In particular, the purpose of such instruments is to have the
agent (at the expense of some information rent) internalise the principal’s
preferences when performing his/her tasks. A literature has developed to
test the extent to which such incentive contracts perform the roles they are
designed for. The key papers here are well summarised in Prendergast (1999)
and cover settings as diverse as executive compensation schemes (Murphy
(1999)) and the cost of legal aid in England and Wales (Gray et al. (1999)).
Recent work has highlighted an additional source of inefficiency in principal-
agent relationships: the favouritism that principals can show towards chosen
agents. In theory, this can influence numerous economic settings. Thus,
Prendergast and Topel (1996) show how favouritism can bias the evalua-
tion of agents’ performance in organisations and, in turn, their behaviour.
Similarly, large-scale public expenditure decisions can be aﬄicted by such
behaviour: for example, the choice of procurement partner by government
departments (Naegelen and Mougeot (1998)) and the regional allocation of
public goods in the presence of political bias (Zantman (2002)). In fact, it
seems likely that most people will recognise circumstances where favouritism
has (or could have) been exercised by principals and this raises the important
question of how such behaviour may be controlled.1
A potential answer to this question may be to use financial incentives.
Such a possibility arises when (as is often the case) the principals favour-
1“Control” of favouritism is a more appropriate objective than its eradication: as Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) show, to the extent that parties enjoy exercising favouritism, its
eradication removes a source of welfare.
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ing particular agents are, themselves, agents to a higher principal who may
wish to control such behaviour. For example, Prendergast and Topel (1996)
model the favouritism exercised by “supervisors” towards “workers” in a
manager-supervisor-worker hierarchy. They show that the “managers” can
use financial incentives to control supervisors’ favouritism. Inspired by this
insight, the current paper provides the first test (to our knowledge) of the
extent to which financial incentives can help control favouritism in such hier-
archical principal-agent settings. In particular, we ask whether a governing
body in soccer (the ‘higher principal’) can influence the favouritism displayed
by referees (the ‘principals’) towards players/teams (the ‘agents’).
Empirical studies of favouritism in general are limited by the difficult
task of its identification but soccer has recently proved a fruitful setting
for such analysis.2 Garicano et al. (2005) find evidence that soccer referees
favour home teams when adjudicating matches. Using data from Spain’s top
soccer league (the Primera Liga), the authors find that referees add more
injury time when the home team is behind in a close game than when it is
ahead in a close game (as opposed to those games where the scores are too
far apart for additional injury time to make a difference). They attribute
this “favouritism” to the social pressure applied by home team supporters.
The evident measurability of this favouritism has encouraged several similar
studies based on other soccer leagues. Using additional control variables,
Sutter and Kocher (2004), Lucey and Power (2004) and Dohmen (2005),
all produce a qualitatively similar finding on injury time to Garicano et al.
(2005)’s in German, Italian and US soccer leagues respectively. In addition,
2Favouritism has also received empirical examination in used car markets (Knowles
et al. (2001): racial bias) and, indeed, in academic publishing (Medoff (2003): editorial
bias). In the context of soccer, the idea that referees may exercise favouritism has gained
credibility in the light of recent scandals in Germany, Italy and Brazil; see “The worst
scandal of them all”, www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport, July 25, 2006.
2
Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) also discover that referees are
more inclined to award penalty kicks for the home team as opposed to the
away team (see also Nevill et al. (1996)). Finally, Nevill et al. (2002) use a
series of controlled experiments with video-taped matches and actual referees
to show that crowd noise can influence refereeing decisions.3
It is important to consider the mechanisms by which financial incentives
might influence referees’ decisions. In principle, favouritism can arise through
conscious or unconscious responses to crowd pressure.4 Garicano et al. (2001)
present a model in which referees select their levels of favouritism to maximise
a utility function that depends on satisfying home and away fans (the former
with a larger weight) and the probability of being reappointed next season
(which declines with the soccer authorities’ perception of the referees’ bias).
In this context, additional financial rewards to retaining professional status
would (ceteris paribus) alter the referee’s marginal conditions for optimal
favouritism towards its reduction. Such conscious bias is also modelled in
Prendergast and Topel (1996).
Financial incentives may continue to influence favouritism if referees are
not so ‘calculating’, however. This is a point developed in Becker and Mur-
phy (2000), where social influences are acknowledged to affect individual
choices in more ‘unconscious’ ways. This is how Dohmen (2005) interprets
3The presence of home bias amongst sports referees has received attention from a
variety of disciplines (see the surveys in Courneya and Carron (1992) and Nevill and
Holder (1999)); while psychologists and health scientists have uncovered a number of
potential causes of such behaviour (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Wickens and
Hollands (2000) and Neave and Wolfson (2003)). More generally, economists have also
discussed the interaction between ‘social’ factors and market outcomes (e.g. Becker and
Murphy (2000)).
4Apparently, people involved in soccer recognise these possibilities: “[officials] must be
sensitive to crowd reactions, they’re only human. I used to think they did it on purpose;
now I think they just can’t avoid it.” (Neil Warnock, manager of Sheffield United, on
Match of the Day 2, BBC TV, October 23, 2005).
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the causes of referee bias. In such settings, Becker and Murphy discuss how
financial incentives can operate on socially-influenced preferences: for exam-
ple, in our context, referees may become more aware of the influence of the
crowd on their decisions when considering strategies to help retain their pro-
fessional status. In this case, financial rewards encourage self-evaluation of
performance and produce conformity as referees ‘work harder’ to control their
response to social pressure.5 Thus, whether referees’ favouritism is viewed as
a conscious or unconscious reaction to the social pressures in evidence at a
soccer match, it seems reasonable to anticipate that financial incentives may
help to check it.
To perform our analysis, we make use of a natural experiment that took
place in English soccer in 2001-02. This season saw the introduction of several
measures aimed at improving the quality of refereeing in English professional
soccer, and these included the introduction of professional referees to the
English Premier League.6 For the first time, a group of referees was retained
for the whole soccer season on a full salary (plus match fees). Along with the
intertemporal comparison in performance that this provides, the fact that
only the Premier League (in contrast to the leagues below it) introduced
this change means that the natural experiment is particularly rare in also
containing a cross-sectional dimension.
Like the papers cited above, we first establish the presence of favouritism
in our data using Garicano et al. (2005)’s approach: looking for the first
5Taylor et al. (2005)) provide a broad treatment of these issues. More specifically,
Loewenstein and Moore (2004) describe how unconscious self-interest (such as a referee
might respond to when in front of a large home crowd) can come into conflict with one’s
ethical and professional obligations to others. While the operation of self-interest may be
“unconscious” and “automatic”, understanding these other obligations “often involves a
more thoughtful process” (p. 189).
6As discussed in Section 2, other measures included organisational changes which, in
turn, impacted on referees’ training. See NCCFR (2002) for background to the changes.
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time at the relationship between injury time and home team match posi-
tion in close games for English soccer. We discover favouritism similar to
(though smaller than) Garicano et al. (2005)’s in the pre-professional En-
glish Premier League. However, we find that favouritism disappears in our
post-professional Premier League data: this suggests a clear response to the
incentives introduced by the policy.7 Our results have implications for the
multi-million pound worldwide soccer ‘industry’.8 More generally, they also
provide empirical support for the use of financial contracts to govern this
relatively subtle element of principal-agent behaviour.
We address several possible arguments that could contradict this conclu-
sion. First, it could be argued that we are picking up a ‘quality’ effect in
the sense that the best referees are used in the Premier League and, as such,
they are best able to ignore tendencies towards favouritism. Our use of fixed
effects controls for this selection bias but does not remove the effect we find
from professionalism. Second, it may be that (for whatever reason) the re-
ductions in score-dependent injury time that we find could have happened
across English professional soccer in general; again, this would limit the ex-
tent to which financial incentives were controlling favouritism. As noted
above, we are able to use contemporaneous data from the English First Divi-
7Of the papers cited earlier, Garicano et al. (2005) are clear that their paper examines
only “non-monetary incentives” (p. 11) and this is also true in Sutter and Kocher (2004).
Dohmen (2005) uses German data over nine seasons in which he reports increases in the
fees paid to referees but he does not seek to identify any relationship between fee rises
and levels of bias. In fact, the changes in bias that he does observe are not systematic.
Lucey and Power (2004) note smaller levels of bias in Italy than the US and imply that
this may be related to the higher financial rewards for referees in the former. Neither of
these papers provides a satisfactory basis for examining the role of financial incentives in
controlling favouritism: what is needed is an explicit exogenous change in the financial
incentives faced by referees such as the one we examine.
8The President of soccer’s governing body (FIFA), Joseph Blatter, has recently re-
sponded to allegations of cheating amongst German soccer referees with the comment
that professional referees are “the solution . . . once you have a career, and you see it as
going to work, then you’re not going to cheat.” (Kicker, 1 March 2005).
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sion (as it was called during our data period) and this allows us to control for
such a soccer-wide effect.9 Again, our conclusion remains. In addition the
cross-sectional component of our data allows us (unlike others) to consider
whether our injury time variable is less related to favouritism than to natural
asymmetries between the performances of home and away teams: our results
suggest that this is not the case. Third, perhaps our results reflect a training
effect coming about through superior training of professional referees. Al-
though we cannot directly control for this possibility, we present (in Section
2) several arguments to suggest that differential training and assessment of
referees are unlikely to be the principal influence on our results—especially
in the two leagues we study.
Last, but by no means least, we consider the question of whether the
measure of favouritism used in this paper (and its antecedents) is a suitable
one. In particular, a plausible alternative hypothesis might be that teams
approach the end of a game in different ways depending on the score. For
example, when the home team is behind, it may press harder for an equalising
goal and this may lead to more infringements by the away side, or the away
team may seek to waste time to protect a valuable away victory. Both of
these scenarios could lead to additional injury time being played as a result
of the referee seeking to compensate for such behaviour. Clearly, this is an
important issue but, also, a potentially elusive one. Nonetheless, our natural
experiment allows an interpretation of the results in line with this view. To
this extent, therefore, our paper provides an important agenda for future
research on the measurement of favouritism.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section provides more
9Since August 2004, the First Division has been called the Coca Cola Championship
but, as our data pre-date this change of name, we refer to it throughout by its previous
name.
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detail on the switch to professional referees that underlies our natural ex-
periment. Section 3 then presents our data and descriptive statistics before
Section 4 sets out and discusses our results. The concluding section discusses
our results and suggests extensions to our work.
2 Professional soccer referees
Referees (along with two assistants) officiate at all soccer games. Their task
is to adjudicate incidents according to rules laid down by the Federation of
International Football Associations (FIFA), to apply appropriate sanctions
when they deem these rules to have been broken, and to time proceedings
so that 90 minutes of play (in two halves of 45 minutes) take place—this
will typically require additional time to compensate for stoppages resulting
from, say, player injuries, player substitutions and time wasting by the play-
ers. During the game, the referee is the sole adjudicator of infringements
and exercises considerable discretion when interpreting players’ actions and
deciding appropriate responses (FIFA (2002)).
Reforms to refereeing in English professional soccer were introduced ahead
of the 2001-02 season. These sought to address concerns about the quality
of refereeing in all four professional soccer leagues at a time when the game’s
commercial and media profile was developing rapidly. In particular, it was
felt that referees needed a clearer regulatory regime, consistent training, de-
velopment and monitoring regimes and, for the top games (see below), mean-
ingful financial incentives commensurate with the game’s profile. As such, in
2001 the Professional Game Match Officials Board (PGMOB) replaced the
National Review Board. Its task was to provide match officials for all pro-
fessional games played in England, to assess their performance throughout
7
the season, and to ensure consistency of training across the leagues.10 Offi-
cials were divided into two broad groups. First, the Select Group, currently
comprising 19 referees and 38 assistant referees, officiate at the top games
including all those in the English Premier League.11 Second, the National
List of officials includes over two hundred individuals as referees and assistant
referees who officiate in the remaining professional fixtures.
It should be noted that considerable effort is taken to ensure compa-
rability of the training and assessment methods across Select Group and
National List referees: as we have said, training and assessment reforms took
place across the leagues. All referees’ performances are evaluated from the
stands by an independent assessor and referees deemed to have performed
poorly face a number of sanctions, the ultimate one being either temporary
or permanent removal from their current list, with associated implications
for income and status.12 In addition it is important that basic training levels
are reasonably homogeneous (in particular, between Division 1 and the Pre-
miership). In part, this is to ensure that promotion to the Select Group is
possible. For example, on promotion to the Select Group in 2004-05, Mark
Clattenburg commented that “the hard work that goes into training referees
on the National List means that I am ready to make the step up to the Select
Group” (www.premierleague.com). Also, each week, several Select Group
referees officiate in Division 1 games and it would be regarded as unaccept-
able if these games were refereed to a different standard than those elsewhere
in the league that week.
10It should be noted that all referees underwent regular training/fitness assessments and
match-by-match performance assessment prior to 2001-02. The new regime built upon this
and promoted development and consistency of the programmes.
11These referees also officiate at some Football League games and certain FA Cup and
League Cup games.
12For instance, Select Group referee Andy D’Urso received a 28-day ban in September
2004 for incorrectly sanctioning a player.
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The most significant change introduced related to the remuneration of top
referees. Prior to the 2001-02 season, referees were employed as amateurs and
earned as little as a few hundred pounds per game (plus expenses)—see NC-
CFR (2002). In contrast, Select Group referees are professional, receiving an
annual retainer fee of £33,000 plus £900 per game, meaning that a profes-
sional referee is virtually certain to earn over £40,000 in the 2001-02 season
(and subsequently increased). A number of referees continue to work in other
professions during the week.13
To summarise, soccer referees exercise considerable discretion when offi-
ciating games and this may encourage favouritism in their decision making.
Top-level referees in England have recently received a significant increase in
the remuneration they receive. To the extent that the monitoring and as-
sessment regimes in place provide a credible, and high, opportunity cost to
making poor decisions, professionalism might be expected to have reduced
scope for favouritism amongst top referees. The remainder of the paper seeks
to test this conjecture. We begin by presenting our data.
3 Data
At the level of professional soccer players (as opposed to referees), English
soccer is divided into four national leagues. We have data from the top two
of these: the Premier League (whose referees became professional in 2001-
02) and, below this, the First Division (whose referees remained ‘amateur’).
The former consists of twenty teams who play each other home and away
during a season (yielding a total of 38 matches per team); the latter consists
13It should be noted that, of the 21 referees officiating in the Premier League in the
1999-00 season, 15 were also refereeing in the 2002-03 professional season.
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of twenty-four teams, again playing each other home and away (meaning 46
matches per team in a season). Each season, three teams are relegated from
the Premier League to the First Division, with three teams being promoted
in the opposite direction and three teams also being relegated from the First
Division. Thus, as the season progresses, matches develop added significance.
For every match in these two leagues (for the seasons 1999-00 and 2002-
03), we have data on the goals scored by home and visiting teams, the injury
time added by the referee at the end of each half of play, sanctions handed
out by referees to players for infringements of the rules (‘yellow cards’ for
moderate infringements and ‘red cards’ for significant infringements14), crowd
attendance figures and the names of referees who were in charge of each
game. These data come from the Press Association. In addition, we also
have information on the timing of goals scored in injury time in the Premier
League (from Opta Index). Equivalent data are not available for the First
Division; instead, goals occurring in or after the final minute of each half
are timed at either 45 or 90 minutes. We assume that goals recorded in this
way in the First Division are injury time goals.15 The data on the remaining
variables come from several sources. Player substitutions during each game
come from the www.soccerbase.com website. Annual turnover measures for
Premier League clubs were gathered from annual balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts lodged with Companies House. Table rankings of home
teams at the end of the season and ground capacity were collected from
14Two yellow cards constitute a red card which, in turn, means a player’s ejection from
the game and his side’s numbers being reduced accordingly for the remainder of the game.
15Our Opta Index data show that ninety per cent of goals timed at either 45 or 90
minutes in the Premier League in the 1999-00 season were scored during injury time. This
compares with 70 per cent in the 2002-03 season. Thus, our assumption for the First
Division is likely to be reasonable. It is certainly implausible that most goals timed at 45
or 90 minutes were scored at precisely that time, with only a small number being scored
in injury time.
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relevant Rothman’s Football Yearbooks.
Before proceeding to discuss our results, we explain our choice of seasons
for analysis (1999-00 and 2002-03). Clearly, it is important for us that these
seasons span the onset of professional Premier League referees (in 2001-02).
By not using the seasons immediately before and after the new professional
referee era, we aim to avoid potential anticipation effects (in 2000-01) and
disequilibrium responses (in 2001-02). Accordingly, we believe our data can
help distinguish the ‘steady-state’ effects of professional referees.
Tables 1A and 1B provide summary statistics for the variables used in
this analysis over the seasons 1999-00 and 2002-03 and in the Premiership
and First Division, respectively. The data cover 760 Premier League matches
(i.e. 20 teams playing 19 home games in each of two seasons) and 1,104 First
Division games (i.e. 24× 23× 2). Both tables display similar patterns, with
a little quantitative difference. Thus, in both leagues, home teams won on
average (by nearly half a goal in the Premier League, and just over a third
of a goal in the First Division). In both cases, home teams scored roughly
1.5. goals per game, with visitors netting a little over one. Second-half injury
time produced more goals for home and away teams in both leagues. In part,
this reflected the longer duration of second-half injury time. First Division
injury time was longer than in the Premier League, reflecting in part the
slightly higher number of player substitutions in that league. Furthermore,
home teams scored more goals in both first- and second-half injury time, in
both leagues. As might be expected for the higher profile league with larger
clubs, Premier League attendances averaged more than twice those in the
First Division, with grounds almost 90% full; First Division grounds were
roughly two-thirds full.
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4 Results and interpretations
4.1 Results
The exogenous change of rewards to referees in the Premier League in the
2001-02 season, presents a unique opportunity of testing whether referees
respond to financial incentives. In Table 2 we begin our testing for this
by using specifications very similar to those used in Garicano et al. (2005).
The dependent variable is second half injury time in games where the goal
difference is one; i.e. games that are ‘close’ in the sense that their outcome
could be altered by a few more seconds of play. As in Garicano et al. (2005),
favouritism is captured by the coefficient on the SCORE DIFFERENCE
dummy which is equal to one if the home team is ahead by one goal and
zero if the home team is behind by one goal. The estimated coefficient
on this dummy reported in column (i) is negative, small in magnitude but
strongly significant (i.e. at 1%). On average, injury time is shorter by 18
seconds, substantially lower than the estimate of 1.88 minutes in Garicano
et al. (2005). However, as columns (ii)–(iv) in Table 2 indicate, the presence
of additional regressors increases the measure of favouritism to roughly 30
seconds, in each case with strong statistical significance. This should be
interpreted as the effect of favouritism (in Garicano et al. (2005)’s terms) on
second half injury time in the pre-professional period.16,17
16This additional injury time is lower than that found in Spain and the US. One ex-
planation for this could be that the shorter travel distances in England (and in Germany
and Italy, where lower times have also been found) produce a greater preponderance of
away team supporters at English games and this exerts a social pressure to counter that
postulated by Garicano et al. (2005).
17 As noted in the Introduction, it might be argued that this effect (which we—and
others—term ‘favouritism’) is, in fact, the result of away teams who are a goal ahead
experiencing considerable pressure from home teams seeking an equaliser and this may
result in additional free-kicks and injury time. We return to this in Section 4.2.
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In columns (ii)–(iv) in Table 2 we test for the change in financial rewards
of referees by including interaction terms between the YEAR of observation
and the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy. YEAR denotes a dummy variable
equal to 1 in the post-professional referee period (2002-03 season) and 0 for
games in the pre-professional period (1999-00 season). The interaction term
SCORE DIFFERENCE × YEAR is positive and significant. The estimated
coefficients largely offset those on SCORE DIFFERENCE, suggesting that
the favouritism of roughly 30 seconds is more-or-less removed after the in-
troduction of professional referees.18 This is consistent with the introduction
of professional referees generating strong enough financial incentives to influ-
ence referees’ behaviour.19
There are two important concerns with the results discussed above. First,
perhaps the highest quality referees are offered professional contracts, in
which case, we might simply be picking up a selection bias as opposed to
the effects of financial incentives per se. We address this issue by employing
referee fixed effects in column (iv) of Table 2. Thus, the results reported
18Using the column (ii) results, we test for whether the estimate on the SCORE DIF-
FERENCE × YEAR interaction term is equal (and of opposite sign) to SCORE DIFFER-
ENCE itself: the resultant t-statistic is 0.49 so the null hypothesis is upheld in this case.
Thus the effect of favouritism disappears after the introduction of professional referees.
19We have considered the robustness of our measure of favouritism in two ways. First,
we have looked at whether the ‘closeness’ of a game matters. For example, we find that
the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy is small and statistically insignificant when there is a
two-goal difference in the score at the end of the second half. This finding is consistent with
the evidence in Garicano et al. (2005) and contributes to the view that the differences in
injury time are related to the prospects that they can alter match outcomes. To investigate
further the issue of favouritism, we have also tested whether referees end the game quicker
after a home goal is scored in injury time than an away goal. In the Premier league during
the 1999-00 and 2002-03 seasons, there were 77 games in which either the home team
or the away team scored one goal in second half injury time. We found no evidence to
suggest that the amount of injury time depended on who scored. This is in contrast to
the findings in Garicano et al. (2005). Second, we have included games that were level
at full-time, on the grounds that referees may also seek to protect a home team’s single
point for a draw. The qualitative nature of our results is not altered by this. (All of these
results are available from the authors.)
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above ultimately control for potential quality effects.
The second important concern relates to the fact that the professional ref-
eree group does not cover other leagues, so that the reduction in favouritism
we have found may simply reflect a trend across all of English football. One
example might be the training developments that were introduced, across all
leagues, at the same time as the Premier League’s professional referees; al-
though training programmes existed before, it is possible that developments
in 2001 led to a ‘training effect’ and this is what we have so far picked up.
A particular strength of our data is that we are able to use First Division
matches as a control group (given that referees here remained amateur but,
in other ways—including training,—were subject to similar developments as
Premier League ones) in order to control for such a ‘soccer-wide’ effect.
Table 3 presents basic statistics on average injury time in games which
ended with a one goal difference before and after the introduction of profes-
sional referees, across the two football leagues. Looking at Table 3, second
half injury time before 2001 was 2.874 minutes in Premier League games,
compared with 3.083 minutes for the First Division. After 2001 there was
an increase in injury time of 0.41 minutes (2.874 to 3.284) for the Premier
League. There was a 0.724 increase in minutes for the control group. Taken
together, these figures suggest a response of -0.314 minutes. On balance,
then, the unconditional difference-in-difference estimates in Table 3 point
to a fall in injury time added by referees when professional in the Premier
League compared to the control group of the First Division.
Table 4 moves to a regression framework, employing the straightforward
differences-in-differences-in-differences specification. The dependent variable
is the length of injury time in games that ended with a one goal difference.
The PREMIER LEAGUE dummy variable is equal to 1 for games in the
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Premiership and 0 for games in the First Division. Favouritism is again
captured by the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy variable, which equals 1 if
the home team is ahead by one goal and 0 if the home team is behind by one
goal. Of course, the interpretation of this variable must now recognise that
our results involve two football leagues, as well as two periods of time: as such
it shows the impact of the score difference on second half injury time in the
First Division (i.e. PREMIER LEAGUE is set to zero) in the pre-professional
era (YEAR has also been set to zero). Thus, the coefficient on SCORE
DIFFERENCE should be interpreted as the effect of Garicano et al. (2005)’s
measure of favouritism on second half injury time in the pre-professional
period in First Division games. The coefficients of central interest in Table
4 are those on the triple interaction term, PREMIER LEAGUE × SCORE
DIFFERENCE × YEAR. The coefficient measures the change between the
pre- and post-professional referee periods in Premier League compared to
First Division second half injury time in games when the home team is leading
by one goal.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the preliminary findings in Table
2. As the coefficients on PREMIER LEAGUE × SCORE DIFFERENCE
show, on average injury time is shorter in the Premiership by roughly 25
seconds when the home team is ahead by one goal. However, the introduction
of professional referees had a significant positive effect on second half injury
time in the Premier League compared to the First Division. In terms of
magnitude, the estimated effect of professional referees on second half injury
time in the Premier League compared to First Division is 0.633 in column (i),
0.591 in column (ii) and 0.593 in column (iii)—i.e. something in the order
or 35 seconds; these estimates are consistent with favouritism being removed
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after the introduction of professional referees.20
4.2 Interpretations
The introduction of professional referees created financial rewards for Select
Group referees and our results are consistent with these encouraging referees
to allocate injury time in a more independent way than was previously the
case: in Garicano et al. (2005)’s terms, a reduction in favouritism. This is
also consistent with the hypotheses in Prendergast and Topel (1996). Whilst
we have controlled for the quality of individual referees and for soccer-wide
effects, other interpretations of the results also need consideration. We now
turn to these.
One possibility is that the effect we have found results from the superior
training of professional referees, as opposed to their desires to retain financial
rewards through good performance. While we acknowledge this possibility,
we believe that it is unlikely to be the main distinction between the two
leagues analysed above. This is because, as noted in Section 2, there are
good reasons to believe that training regimes across the two leagues need to
foster promotion to the Select Group and comparability when Select Group
(and National List) referees are officiating in the same competitions (as hap-
pens each week). In addition, both sets of referees are subject to the same
independent performance assessment procedures at each game. Given these
tendencies towards limited training differentials (and negligible assessment
ones), we feel that the principal difference between the two groups of referees
relates to income (a guarantee of over £40,000 in the season we study versus
smaller match fees plus expenses). To this extent, it seems reasonable to
20Note that these results also cast doubt on the alternative hypothesis mentioned in
Footnote 17.
16
interpret our results in terms of the effects of financial incentives.
Another possibility, alluded to in note 17, questions the measure of favouritism
used in this (and previous) papers. In particular, it is possible that the the
way in which the game is played depends (at least in part) on the score.
Thus, when the home team is behind it may push hard for an equalising goal
and the sustained pressure may lead to additional free kicks. Similarly, the
away team might waste time in an attempt to protect a valuable away win.
Both of these would cause the referee to add more injury time than if the
match situation was reversed. On this view, our dependent variable does not
measure referees exhibiting favouritism but referees ‘doing their jobs’.
Clearly, this is an important critique, not only for our paper but also
for related literature. It is also a difficult one to assess empirically because
it requires awareness of the pattern of play within any particular game. A
number of features of our results are consistent with this view, however. First,
the fact that we observe a relatively small injury time differential between
the home team being behind or ahead might indicate that referees are not
seeking to give realistic opportunities for additional scoring. Second, our
finding (in note 19) that the identity of injury time scorers does not alter
the time added may also suggest that favouritism is not being exercised.
Third, the results in Tables 2 and 4 could be consistent with this alternative
hypothesis. This would be the case if it were argued that professional referees
are better able to control a game than non-professional ones. We have argued
that training may not be the source of this advantage but it is still possible
that professionals reflect more carefully on their performance (see note 2) or
simply command more respect from players. As such, they may be in better
control of games and less likely to face frantic tackling or time wasting as the
end approaches.
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As might be expected, these comments suggest that the measurement of
favouritism is a delicate task; indeed, it is interesting that our data allow
us to consider such subtle effects in a way that previous studies have not
been able to. Of course, as noted earlier, others have found larger injury
time differentials than our English data exhibit and, also, other indications
that apparently suggest favouritism on the part of referees. Further, recent
scandals relating to referees and match-fixing in Germany, Italy and Brazil
add credibility to this possibility. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to note the
issues surrounding whether injury time measures favouritism and to acknowl-
edge that any ambiguity we have uncovered should keep the measurement of
favouritism itself at the forefront of research in this area.
5 Conclusions
An increasingly popular measure of favouritism has been introduced by Gar-
icano et al. (2005) in the context of soccer. Using this definition, we believe
our paper is the first to examine the extent to which such behaviour may be
controlled; in our case by financial incentives. The paper’s main contribution
is to present evidence consistent with such control. We have argued that such
financial incentives may be useful either by altering the net marginal benefits
from favouritism to a referee who wishes to please the home crowd but does
not want to lose professional status, or by encouraging referees to reflect on
their performances in such a way as to become aware of the possibilities for
favouritism that may arise from social pressure. At the same time, another
contribution of the paper is to highlight a potential ambiguity in the inter-
pretation of the measure of favouritism that we adopt. This ambiguity may
imply that our results are also consistent with professional referees exercising
18
more control over games, but not because they are aiming to help the home
side. This is an interesting possibility that clearly merits additional research.
It is worth being clear that, in a multi-million pound high-profile sport
like soccer, the performance of referees is of more than academic interest:
promotion, relegation, prize money for league placings and players’ careers
could all be at stake, in principle, if soccer games are not officiated to high
standards. Our results are therefore important in indicating that principals
may control their agents by appropriate and, in some sense, intuitive means.
Of course, this is important in a growing literature that has highlighted
the potential for favourisitsm in principal-agent relationships. It also has
implications for soccer around the world at a time when senior officials are
recommending professional referees as a solution to high profile allegations
of referees’ cheating (see note 8).
An interesting question raised by our results is the extent to which pro-
fessional referees have increased welfare in English soccer. Of course, to the
extent that home teams now receive less ‘favours’ from referees, we have not
identified a Pareto improving policy. However, one might argue that some of
the costs of tackling favouritism identified by Prendergast and Topel (1996)
are not present in our setting. In particular, because referees negotiated the
professional package before signing up to it, a revealed preference argument
might suggest that they have been compensated for the loss of welfare associ-
ated with being less able to exercise discretion. If so, then the wider benefits
of impartiality and objectivity that we have identified might be said to imply
a positive welfare effect from professional referees.
We note that our results could be further strengthened by data on refer-
ees’ earnings outside football (which would influence the opportunity cost of
being removed from the professional referees’ list) and on referees’ individ-
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ual characteristics. Perhaps understandably, referees and their professional
association, are protective of such data and we have (so far) been unable to
generate consistent observations for such controls. In addition, in order to
distinguish more clearly between the two interpretations of Garicano et al.
(2005)’s measure of favouritism, it would be necessary to have more detail
on activity that takes place during a soccer game. Such data are difficult to
come by but would add a valuable dimension to an already important, and
interesting, research agenda.
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Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics for the Premier League Sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Score difference 760 0.461 1.721 -6 8 
Score home  760 1.586 1.289 0 8 
Score visitor 760 1.125 1.098 0 6 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1st half home 
760 0.036 0.185 0 1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2nd half home 
760 0.068 0.258 0 2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1st half visitor 
760 0.015 0.119 0 1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2nd half visitor 
760 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Minutes injury time 1st 
half 
760 1.796 1.022 0 14 
Minutes injury time 2nd 
half 
760 2.822 1.050 0 9 
Yellow cards home 760 1.393 1.207 0 5 
Yellow cards visitor 760 1.838 1.352 0 7 
Red cards home 760 0.063 0.259 0 2 
Red cards visitor 760 0.120 0.337 0 2 
Total player 
substitutions 
760 3.993 1.303 0 6 
Attendance (000’s) 760 33.114 11.099 8.248 67.721 
Attendance/Capacity 760 0.896 0.119 0.314 1.038 
      
Note: A maximum value for attendance/capacity greater than one is due either to a combination of 
heterogeneous data sources or to ground improvements over the season. In fact, Southampton and 
Watford are the only teams in our Premier League data with reported attendances at some games 
greater than the ground capacity. 
 
 
Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics for the First Division Sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Score difference 1104 0.389 1.637 -6 6 
Score home  1104 1.509 1.222 0 7 
Score visitor 1104 1.120 1.114 0 7 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1st half home 
1104 0.058 0.238 0 2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2nd half home 
1104 0.075 0.267 0 2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1st half visitor 
1104 0.039 0.194 0 1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2nd half visitor 
1104 0.050 0.218 0 1 
Minutes injury time 1st 
half 
1104 2.233 1.189 0 14 
Minutes injury time 2nd 
half 
1104 3.203 1.187 0 10 
Yellow cards home 1104 1.151 1.122 0 7 
Yellow cards visitor 1104 1.647 1.295 0 7 
Red cards home 1104 0.066 0.273 0 2 
Red cards visitor 1104 0.119 0.363 0 2 
Total player 
substitutions 
1104 4.024 1.273 0 6 
Attendance (000’s) 1104 14.793 7.093 0.849 33.027 
Attendance/Capacity 1104 0.655 0.202 0.032 1.047 
      
Note: A maximum value for attendance/capacity greater than one is due either to a combination of 
heterogeneous data sources or to ground improvements over the season. In fact, Portsmouth, Walsall, 
Crewe and Fulham are the only teams in our First Division data with reported attendances at some 
games greater than the ground capacity. 
 
Table 2: Score difference and Year Interactions 
 
Independent variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
     
Constant      3.251*** 
(0.091) 
     3.172*** 
(0.126) 
     2.248*** 
(0.207) 
2.290 
(1.935) 
Score difference    -0.300*** 
(0.120) 
    -0.516***
(0.166) 
    -0.503*** 
(0.159) 
   -0.531*** 
(0.191) 
Year  0.159 
(0.178) 
0.079 
(0.172) 
0.214 
(0.419) 
Score difference × Year   0.435* 
(0.235) 
 0.398* 
(0.226) 
 0.456* 
(0.263) 
Yellow cards        0.092*** 
(0.037) 
   0.106** 
(0.044) 
Red cards   -0.012 
(0.132) 
-0.044 
(0.152) 
Player substitutions        0.208*** 
(0.044) 
    0.200*** 
(0.054) 
     
Referee Fixed effects No No No Yes 
Team Fixed effects No No No Yes 
     
R2 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.32 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is the length of injury time in games that ended with a 1 goal difference. 
Score difference is equal to 1 if the home team is ahead by 1 goal before injury time begins, and 0 if it 
is behind by 1 goal.  ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 
per cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regression in column (iv) include 
controls for turnover of clubs, table rankings of home teams, the absolute value of the difference in 
ranks, attendance, ratio of attendance to capacity and monthly dummies. 
 
Table 3: Second half injury time 
 
 Pre-Professional 
Referee Period 
Post-Professional 
Referee Period 
Difference 
    
Premier League 2.874 
(0.095) 
3.284 
(0.069) 
0.410*** 
       (0.117) 
First Division 3.083 
(0.072) 
3.806 
(0.081) 
0.724*** 
       (0.108) 
Difference-in-
Difference 
  -0.314** 
        (0.159) 
    
Notes: The sample includes games in which the second half ended with a 1 goal difference before 
injury time begins. *** and ** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Pre-professional period is the 1999-00 season. Post-
professional period defined as the 2002-03 season. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Score difference, Year and League Interactions 
 
Independent variable (i) (ii) (iii) 
    
Premier League   0.245 
 (0.214) 
  0.202 
 (0.223) 
  -0.107 
  (0.301) 
Score difference  -0.097 
 (0.156) 
 -0.140 
 (0.154) 
 -0.166 
 (0.161) 
Year   0.834*** 
 (0.182) 
  0.761*** 
 (0.178) 
  0.625*** 
 (0.244) 
Premier League × Score difference 
 
 -0.417* 
 (0.235) 
 -0.387* 
 (0.229) 
 -0.349 
 (0.238) 
Premier League × Year 
 
 -0.654*** 
 (0.266) 
 -0.686*** 
 (0.260) 
 -0.560 
 (0.361) 
Score difference × Year 
 
 -0.233 
 (0.221) 
 -0.249 
 (0.215) 
 -0.208 
 (0.222) 
Premier League × Score difference × Year 
 
  0.633** 
 (0.332) 
  0.591* 
 (0.324) 
  0.593* 
 (0.336) 
    
    
Referee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Team Fixed Effects No No Yes 
    
R2 0.29 0.33 0.38 
Observations 763 763 763 
    
Notes: The dependent variable is the length of injury time in games that ended with a 1 goal difference. 
Score difference is equal to 1 if the home team is ahead by 1 goal before injury time begins, and 0 if it 
is behind by 1 goal.  ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 
per cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (ii) and (iii) 
include controls for yellow cards, red cards, substitutions, table rankings of home teams, the absolute 
value of the difference in ranks, and attendance. 
 
 
